Ecohesion

Empirical Analysis

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Overview



- The policy-to-distribution link: who bears the brunt of climate policies?

Plenty of studies on this matter:

Lamb et al.
What are the social outcomes of climate policies? A systematic map and review of the ex-post literature
Environ Res Lett 15, 2020

Overview (cont'd)



- The distribution-to-unrest link

Not easy to assess empirically (measurement and data availability issues)

Workaround: experimental application.

↓

A resource extraction game featuring:

(i) resource allocation policies
(ii) punishment as a stylised form of unrest

Design

- Participants start with a certain endowment. Endowments are unequally distributed among individuals ▸ Figure
- Each participant can choose how much of a resource to extract from a finite pool ▸ Figure
- Depletion must not exceed a given threshold level. In case of over-extraction, participants renounce to part of their resource to replenish the pool

  Different allocation policies are used as treatments:

  (a) Individuals contribute equally to replenishment ▸ Figure
  (b) Replenishment starts from wealthier individuals ▸ Figure
  (c) Replenishment starts from poorer individuals ▸ Figure

Design (cont'd)

- At the end of the session each participant can choose to blow the game up and 'punish' others, in which case nobody receives anything but a participation token
- Question: to what extent does a higher resource inequality result in a greater likelihood of blowing things up?

***Grazie* :-)**

Player 1

Player 2





Pool

Player 4

Back

Player 3

Player 1

Player 2

Pool: empty

Player 4

Back

Player 3

Player 1

Player 2

Pool



Player 4

Back

Player 3

Player 1

Player 2



Pool

Player 4

Back

Player 3

Player 1

Player 2

Pool



Player 4

Back

Player 3